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Over the past couple of decades, productive activities of households both within
and outside the formal market have received renewed interest from a heterogeneous
array of disciplines. The recognition of home production is with good reason as it is
far from being a trivial fraction of aggregate output. Estimates indicate that home
production accounts for about 40 to 60 percent of gross national product in most
Western countries (Bonke 1992). In addition, the total amount of time devoted
to work at home is about equal to the time spent in the market (Robinson and
Godbey 1997). As a household is essentially a collection of individuals, valuations
of household output are complemented with studies looking at the division of labor
among its members and more commonly between spouses. While gender disparities
in total amount of work have been less marked (Coltrane 2000; Burda et al 2007),
the skewness in sectoral time allocation of couples has been well acknowledged, with
men assuming a greater proportion of paid labor and women undertaking most of
the domestic work. Much interest has been directed towards understanding where
the imbalance might arise from.
Such specialization is similarly evident in Australia. The husband-wife diﬀeren-
tial in paid work is about 20 hours a week, while the gap in domestic work including
time spent on childcare is approximately (minus) 20 hours1. A loose comparison,
noting the fact that time use data are not precisely comparable across countries,
shows that these mean diﬀerences are close to those of Western European countries
but higher than those observed for the United States, where the gaps are about
13 and -12 hours for paid and unpaid work, respectively (Burda et al 2007). On
average, married women in Australia perform almost twice as much household work
as married men. This paper adds to the understanding of household time allocation
by analyzing the determinants of both market and domestic labor supply of couples
in Australia.
Several explanations have been put forward to address the questions of why
husbands and wives segregate various tasks and why they allocate time diﬀerently.
1 HILDA 2002-2006. Sample criteria and distribution of work are detailed in Section 3.
4Theories of exchange, relative eﬃciency and bargaining posit that individual re-
sources play a key role in intra-household time allocation (Mincer 1962; Becker 1965;
Gronau 1977; McElroy and Horney 1981; Manser and Brown 1980, among others).
That is, the partner with more resources – which may consequently reﬂect greater
earnings potential – will devote more time to the formal labor market. Sociological
insights, on the other hand, suggest that societal norms, which assign exclusive roles
by gender, may override the importance of labor market-relevant characteristics in
household decision-making. It thus remains an empirical question as to the extent to
which spousal disparity in earnings capacities accounts for the asymmetry in work
distribution.
Using a Blinder-Oaxaca type Tobit-decomposition, this paper decomposes the
labor supply diﬀerential between husbands and wives into two sources: (i) due to
diﬀerences in spouses’ potential earnings, which are based on observable character-
istics such as educational attainment, age, health condition and others; and (ii) due
to diﬀerences in weights assigned by husbands and wives to these measured charac-
teristics when determining their labor supply. The diﬀerences in weights are often
presumed to quantify the structural inﬂuence of gender-assigned roles in households
and have been referred to as gender eﬀects (Alvarez and Miles 2003).
Specialization is not an issue per se. As Becker (1981) argues, the division of
labor reﬂects a rational decision of the household aimed at maximizing the aggregate
family utility. However, if valuations attached to paid and unpaid work diﬀer, with
the latter usually assigned a lower exchange value, the distribution of work may
become a welfare concern. A disproportionately high share of domestic work and
low share of market work for an individual may lead to a bargaining disadvantage
within a relationship and poorer opportunities in the event of marital breakdown.
Washbrook (2006) asserts that investigating the role of wages in time alloca-
tion is crucial because it suggests how the development of relative human capital
and convergence of returns to these skills might aﬀect couples’ labor supply deci-
sions. Using data on the evolution of educational attainment in Australia, Kidd and
Shannon (2002) predict a continued progress in the relative level of female human
capital and their relative pay. An important consequent question is: Would such a
5narrowing gender pay gap translate to a more equal work distribution within the
household?
We are not aware of any studies that decompose the spousal diﬀerential in market
and non-market work in Australian households. We believe that it is worthwhile
to decompose the source of disparity in spousal time allocation as this will give us
an indication of the importance of human capital attributes vis-a-vis gender-speciﬁc
eﬀects. This will also give an insight as to how the evolution of gender pay gap
could inﬂuence the division of labor among Australian couples.
Despite the fact that immigrant families make up a substantial part of the Aus-
tralian population, to our knowledge, there has not been any study that analyze
their time allocation behavior. As with other important immigration countries,
married female immigrants have lower labor force participation relative to their
husbands. While there are several studies that examine the labor participation of
married immigrants in Australia vis-a-vis married male immigrants, comparison of
their non-market activities have been overlooked. One reason for this could be the
scarcity of data as immigrants are often under-represented in Time Use Surveys.
Ethnic groups could vary in their views of male and female roles in the family,
household composition and childrearing. Neglecting to distinguish between native
and immigrant families could mask interesting diﬀerences in the family behavior of
diﬀerent groups. Reimers (1985) surmises that such diﬀerences may lead to sys-
tematic diﬀerences in the labor supply of immigrant wives. The wage ratio for
immigrant couples may also diﬀer from that of native families due to diﬀerences in
human capital and returns to these characteristics, which could in turn result in
immigrant families allocating their time diﬀerently to natives. Using data from the
Housing, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, we are able
to conduct the analysis for natives and immigrant families separately and address
that gap in the literature.
In carrying out our analysis, we draw from the procedure of Washbrook (2006).
We predict a gross hourly full-time wage for each individual based on his or her hu-
man capital characteristics. This technique simultaneously addresses the problems
of missing wages for non-participants and the endogeneity of observed wages due to
6the correlation of wages with labor supply. Because of the censored nature of hours
of work, we perform Tobit estimations on labor supply and use these estimates to
perform a Blinder-Oaxaca type decomposition.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a sum-
mary of major theoretical approaches and empirical evidence covering intra-household
time allocation. Section 3 explains our sample selection criteria, provides descriptive
statistics and presents the empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the results of our
estimations. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Literature and Theoretical Framework
Since intra-household time allocation has become an academic pursuit, various be-
havioral models have been oﬀered to explain what inﬂuences households in distribut-
ing tasks. Mincer (1962), Becker (1965), Gronau (1977) and others have developed
household production models where the household maximizes its welfare subject to
budget and time constraints. Household welfare is derived from leisure and consum-
ing commodities produced using a combination of market goods and time inputs of
members. Their framework highlighted responses of individuals to prices of mar-
ket goods and time, income and technologies that inﬂuence the production of home
goods. In this respect, the division of labor between spouses is based on their rel-
ative productivities in paid and unpaid work, with productivity being eﬀectively
measured by the wages they could obtain in the market.2 The spouse with lower
opportunity costs in terms of forgone market earnings will spend more time in paid
work and less on home production.
Another body of research proposes that bargaining power inﬂuences household
decision-making. Bargaining theories yield the same prediction as the relative pro-
ductivity approaches wherein the spouse with higher wage or non-labor income ex-
hibits more power over the allocation of resources including time. In case of coop-
erative bargaining, this power is based on the threat point, which is interpreted as
the utility an individual gets by getting divorced and is a positive function of the
2 This approach is apparently predicated on the implicit assumption that spouses have the same
productivity at home.
7individual’s market wage (McElroy and Horney 1981; Manser and Brown 1980). In
the model of Lundberg and Pollak (1993), the threat point is not divorce but a non-
cooperative equilibrium where spouses remain in the relationship but voluntarily
retract to “separate spheres” that reﬂect traditional gender roles.
Comparative advantage and bargaining theories, in other words, posit that cou-
ples decide time allocation to maximize household welfare without explicit consid-
eration of gender. However, empirical evidence suggests that these models cannot
fully explain the asymmetry in the division of labor. Sociologists, and more recently
economists, acknowledge that norms and socially recognized gender roles exhibit
substantial inﬂuence on family decisions. In an attempt to explain this irregularity,
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) incorporate identity – a socially determined sense of
oneself – in the utility function and assert that the unequal division of labor is a
result of the individual trying to maximize payoﬀs by aﬃrming their identity in so-
ciety. Given social expectations, a husband loses identity when he does housework
or when his wife earns more than half of the household income. Equality of utility
is only restored when the wife performs more housework than the husband. There-
fore, an identity model of household time-allocation predicts an asymmetry in the
division of labor between husbands and wives.
Using Spanish data, Fernandez and Sevilla-Sanz (2006) ﬁnd support for the iden-
tity hypothesis. They observe that wives who earn more than their husbands still
undertake more than 50 percent of housework in line with expected gender identi-
ties. To provide evidence on how important gender speciﬁc eﬀects are to housework
allocation of Spanish two-earner couples, Alvarez and Miles (2003) perform an Oax-
aca (1973) decomposition based on estimates of spouses’ housework in a bivariate
framework. Their analysis shows that 90 percent of the increase in the probability
of egalitarian behavior in housework allocation is due to the adjustment for gender
eﬀects. Washbrook (2006) applies a Tobit-type Oaxaca (1973) decomposition to
both paid and unpaid work of husbands and wives using UK Time Use Survey data.
She ﬁnds that diﬀerences in earnings capacity can account for about 40 percent of
the market work gap and only 16 percent of the domestic work diﬀerential. She
asserts that large gender ﬁxed eﬀects result in women performing far more domestic
8work than men with similar wage rates.
For the case of Australia, Bittman et al (2003) provide evidence on the eﬀects
of income on housework using the 1992 Time Use Survey data. Their results show
that women decrease their housework as their income share increases but only up to
the point where the spouses contribute equally to household income. When women
provide more than half of the household income, they tend to do more housework,
seemingly to compensate for the households’ deviation from the normative standard
of men being the breadwinners. They conclude that while income and characteristics
explain some of the allocation of housework between spouses, at some point gender
does trump money.
With respect to distinguishing immigrant families from native households, van
Klaveren et al (2006) analyze the time allocation behavior of Dutch, Turkish and
Surinamese/Antillean households in the Netherlands. Their results reveal that males
and females increase the number of hours supplied to the labor market when their
own wage rate increases and decrease their labor supply when their respective part-
ner’s wage increases. The wage elasticities for Dutch and Surinamese/Antillean
males are very similar. They also ﬁnd that the power weight, interpreted as the
share of the individual in the household utility, depends on the hourly wage rates
for Dutch and Turkish households but not for Surinamese/Antillean households.
This suggests that an increase in the individual’s wage rate in Dutch or Turkish
households will shift the power distribution in favor of this individual.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data Description
Our study uses unit record data from the Housing, Income and Labour Dynamics
in Australia (HILDA) Survey3 for the period 2002 to 2006.4 The HILDA Survey
3 The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department of
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Aﬀairs (FaHCSIA) and is managed by the
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (MIAESR). The ﬁndings and views
reported in this paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to either FaHCSIA or
the MIAESR.
4 The data was extracted using the Stata R   add-on package PanelWhiz v1.0 (October 2006)
written by John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). The PanelWhiz-generated DO ﬁle and
9is an annual survey which includes a module on individual time use. The module
summarizes the amount of time respondents spend on an activity in a typical week.
Respondents are asked how much time they spend on paid employment, travel to and
from work, household errands, housework, outdoor tasks, playing with and looking
after their own children and of others’, and participation in care and volunteer work.
Other time allocation studies use Time Use Surveys (TUS), which collect data
via the time diary method where respondents are asked to record every episode of
time use on a speciﬁed day or series of days. Using time use data from annual
surveys and TUS have their own merits and limitations. Time diaries tend to be
preferred because it is believed that some activities are diﬃcult to recall and that
there is a potential overestimation in annual surveys because respondents tend to
pick a day when an activity is prominent and treat that as an average day (Juster
and Staﬀord 1991). On the other hand, annual surveys have lower sampling vari-
ability for activities like repairs and home improvement. Since time diaries are only
administered on a day or a few days, such episodic activities, which require a large
amount of time, could produce a distribution that has too many cases of zero value
and too many with very large values. In addition, annual surveys are based on
bigger samples and are far more representative of the population including, for our
purpose, immigrant households. Using annual surveys, given larger sample sizes and
a wider set of demographic variables, allows for a more accurate prediction of wages
based on characteristics.
For the empirical analysis, we restrict our sample to married individuals who
are of working age (15 to 65). We exclude individuals who do not live together
with their respective spouses for the apparent reason that they cannot share house-
work with their partners. On the other hand, we include all individuals whether
or not they participate in the formal labor market to avoid undermining the sexual
division of labor. In later analysis, we will present results for couples where both
spouses undertake paid work. After excluding observations with missing values for
variables used in the analysis, we have a sample of 2,744 unique couples or 7,633
plugins used to retrieve the data are available upon request. Any data or computational errors of
those of the author. Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
10couple-year observations, of which 85 percent are native families (both the husband
and the wife are born in Australia) and 15 percent are immigrant families (both
the husband and the wife are immigrants). While it would also be interesting to
examine the mechanisms within an intermarriage, that is, a union between a native
and an immigrant, issues of endogeneity in intermarriages have been raised in the
literature (see, for instance, Meng and Meurs 2009; Meng and Gregory 2005). Such
endogeneity problem could potentially confound our wage predictions. Thus, for
this particular paper, we will limit our analysis to couples where spouses are either
both Australian-born or are both immigrants.
Tables 1a and 1b present summary statistics of a range of socio-economic vari-
ables relevant to our analysis for the full sample and also for subgroups. The average
age gap between spouses is two years, with men averaging 45 years and women about
43 years. While the share of men with a bachelor’s degree or higher is not materially
diﬀerent from that of women, a somewhat greater proportion of the male sample
have ﬁnished Year 12 (the ﬁnal year of high school) or have obtained a diploma.
The average employment rate of men in our sample is about 86 percent, which is 20
percentage points higher than that of women. A third of the females are out of the
labor force and almost half of those who are employed tend to work on a part-time
basis.
Immigrants in our sample, on average, tend to be older than native Australians,
with immigrants coming from Main English Speaking countries (MES)5 being the
oldest of all groups. A large proportion of immigrants from non-MES countries
have higher educational degrees, 40 percent and 37 percent of men and women,
respectively. These are remarkably higher than those of Australian-born (26 percent
for both genders) and than those of migrants with English-speaking background (27
percent for men and 26 percent for women). However, despite having higher level of
formal qualiﬁcations, immigrants from non-MES countries have lower employment
participation rates, particularly females. Note that the diﬀerence in employment
rates of spouses is about 20 percentage points irrespective of ethnicity.
5 Main-English Speaking countries are United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, USA and South
Africa (HILDA Online Data Dictionary 2008).
11Tables 2a and 2b present the division of labor between spouses. A set of def-
initions of the diﬀerent types of tasks are provided in Appendix - Table A1. We
ﬁnd that, in general, the average number of hours that men and women spend on
total work, i.e. combined market and domestic work6, is not statistically diﬀerent,
which is observed in other studies (see, for instance, Burda et al 2007). This holds
with the exception of couples in non-MES households, where wives work slightly
longer in total than their husbands. We ﬁnd evidence for conventional gender spe-
cialization: a statistically signiﬁcant husband-wife gap of about 20 hours of paid
employment and about (minus) 20 hours of domestic work. Husbands tend to be
more willing to share household work that involves outdoor tasks such as repairs,
gardening or car maintenance. These activities are usually perceived as “male tasks”
so even within household production there seems to be an evidence of segregation of
work. Husbands also tend to participate more, relative to other household tasks, in
childcare activities.7 The male-female wage diﬀerential is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, hence there is an indication that the distribution of work may be partly
due to earnings.
Immigrants from non-English speaking countries have the least number of hours
spent on paid employment. While the gender gap in domestic work is nearly the
same for this group as with others, the diﬀerential in market labor hours is lowest
because of signiﬁcantly less market work hours of non-MES men compared to other
males. Immigrants with English-speaking background receive higher hourly wages,
particularly the men, and they perform the least amount of domestic work. This
could imply that having higher earnings facilitates substitution towards purchased
goods and services and away from household production. While the direction of the
wage gap generally supports the greater attachment of males to the formal labor
market, by comparing subgroups, a higher wage gap does not necessarily translate
to greater specialization.
6 In this analysis, we use the term domestic work interchangeably with unpaid work and house-
hold production.
7 Some studies do not consider childcare as household work since this activity potentially oﬀers
utility or enjoyment to the person. We nevertheless include it in our analysis as it is an important
unpaid activity.
123.2 Predicting Earnings Capacity
Since the paper aims to measure the extent of association between time allocation
and the individuals’ absolute and relative earnings capacities, it is worth discussing
how we deﬁne and obtain the wage variables. Throughout our analysis, we use
gross hourly wages. The use of net hourly wages, as with Washbrook (2006), is
problematic because they are determined jointly with the number of hours of paid
work due to the progressive tax system. For instance, given the same gross wage, a
person who works longer hours would have a lower net hourly wage than someone
who works only for a few hours because of the non-linearity of marginal tax rates.
We predict the gross hourly wage rate that an individual would receive on a
full-time basis. The expected full-time wage is predicted based on the individual’s
level of human capital and personal characteristics and the returns to these factors
in the labor market. This technique simultaneously addresses two issues. Firstly,
since we want to include individuals who do not participate in the labor market
in the analysis, the procedure addresses the problem of missing wages for non-
participants. Secondly, we could alleviate the potential endogeneity problem in
observed wages brought about by the decision to work part-time. In a conventional
labor supply model, an individual is assumed to be oﬀered a constant gross wage and
the individual decides how many hours to supply. However, evidence suggests this is
not necessarily the case (Simpson 1986; Ermisch and Wright 1993). Part-time jobs,
for instance, may oﬀer lower wages in exchange for greater ﬂexibility. Consider the
case where a wife could obtain a full-time wage equal to her husband’s. As a result
of household decision-making, she chooses to specialize in domestic work and take a
part-time job at a lower wage. Comparing the observed wages of the husband and the
wife would suggest that she has chosen to specialize in domestic work partly because
her potential earnings are lower, when the causation runs the other way around.
Predicted full-time wages thereby represent the underlying earnings capacities of
individuals, and the trade-oﬀ of lower wages for job ﬂexibility works only through
the decision to take a part-time job (Washbrook 2006).
The potential wages of part-time workers and non-participants would likely be
overestimated by predicting individuals’ full-time wages by applying estimated coef-
13ﬁcients obtained from a Mincer-type equation on full-time workers. This is partially
because full-time employees may be more productive than part-time workers doing
the same job due to longer work experience and training even though they may have
the same formal qualiﬁcations. In addition, workers who self-select into full-time
employment may possess unobservable characteristics that result in higher wages.
Rodgers (2004) ﬁnds that lower part-time wages in Australia can be explained by
both selection into type of employment and levels of human capital.
Wage equations are estimated separately for full-time workers and for those who
work part-time or who are not part of the labor market, and also separately for
husbands and wives. We follow the procedure of Washbrook (2006) and predict the
earnings capacities of full-time employees using the estimated coeﬃcients obtained
from the wage regression for the sample of full-time workers. On the other hand, for
part-time workers and non-participants, we make the underlying assumption that
their potential wages are drawn from the 25th percentile of the conditional full-time
wage distribution.8 In doing so, we assume that the wages these individuals would
receive for full-time work are lower than those of actual full-time workers because of
the reasons outlined above. Quantile regression models are applied to estimate the
coeﬃcients at the 2th percentile and to obtain the predicted wage.9
3.3 Labor Supply Estimations
We consider a Tobit model for labor supply in order to take into account the nature
of our dependent variable hours of work, of which the distribution is censored from
below at zero due to non-participation in either the formal market or domestic work.
Technically, hours worked could be described as a response variable that takes on
the value zero with positive probability but is a continuous random variable over
strictly positive values (Wooldridge 2002). We write the Tobit model as follows:
8 In a similar fashion, Devereaux (2004) imputed the wages of nonworkers by using the wage
distribution of workers who work 1-13 weeks.
9 For comparison, we carried out the analysis by simply applying the estimated coeﬃcients
derived from wage regressions on all employed individuals (where a dummy for part-time workers
was included) to everyone in the sample. This procedure indeed increases the predicted wages for
part-time workers and more notably for non-participants. While the eﬀects of wages on market
and domestic work are weakened, the overall qualitative eﬀects are similar to the results obtained
using to the approach we discussed above. In Section 4, we obviate the need for predicting wages
for non-participants by restricting the analysis to couples where both spouses are employed.
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∗
gi = Zgiθg + εg, (1)
where Y = M,H, market and domestic labor supply, respectively
g = h,w, husband and wife, respectively





gi = Zgiθg + εg if Y
∗
gi > 0
= 0 otherwise. (2)
We also specify
Zgiθg = W giδg + Xgiβg, (3)
where W gi is a vector of predicted absolute and relative wage rates of individual
gi as predicted from observable characteristics in the manner outlined above, and
Xgi is a vector of controls including age groups, number of children in diﬀerent age
brackets, and household non-labor income (where applies).
The expected value of hours of work given the observable characteristics is com-
prised of the probability of Ygi being uncensored and the expectation of Ygi given a
positive level:












where φ(·) and Φ(·) are standard normal density and cumulative normal density
functions respectively, and σg is the standard error of εg (see Wooldridge (2002) for
derivation).
3.4 Decomposition Analysis
We use a decomposition analysis to determine the extent to which earnings capac-
ities inﬂuence the time allocation behavior of husbands and wives. We isolate the
element of the diﬀerences in hours of market or domestic work that can be explained
15by the diﬀerential in potential wages and other covariates from the element that are
attributable to the returns to these covariates, in the same vein as the decomposition
method proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Since the dependent vari-
able is censored, such that the marginal eﬀects depend on the estimated variance of
the error term, the Blinder-Oaxaca linear model decomposition is not appropriate.
We follow the procedure for Tobit models developed by Bauer and Sinning (2008)10




hw =[ Eθh,σh(Yhit|Zhi)] − [Eθh,σw(Ywi|Zwi)]
+[ Eθh,σw(Ywit|Zwi)] − [Eθw,σw(Ywi|Zwi)]. (5)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Equation (5) represents the diﬀerential in
hours worked between husbands and wives due to diﬀerences in characteristics of the
two groups, while the second term gives the diﬀerential attributable to diﬀerences
in coeﬃcients. The latter term could be interpreted as the gap in hours worked due
to diﬀerent labor supply behaviors of husbands and wives. In the existing literature
(e.g. Alvarez and Miles 2003), this has been referred to as the“gender eﬀect”.
The above speciﬁcation takes the labor supply behavior of husbands as reference,
as shown by the use of σh in the counterfactual parts of the decomposition. This
predicts how much of the hours gap would remain if wives, given their earnings
capacity and personal characteristics, behaved in the same manner as their husbands.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Labor Supply Estimations
Excerpt of the estimation results of the wage regressions that are used to predict
potential earnings are presented in the Appendix - Table A2. The direction of
the eﬀects of the covariates are as expected. In particular, we ﬁnd that higher
wages are strongly associated with higher levels of formal schooling both for males
10 Bauer and Sinning (2008) give a detailed technical discussion of the decomposition method.
We use the Stata add-on program nldecompose.ado (v.2008) written by Sinning et al (2008) for
the empirical analysis.
16and females. Women’s wages are negatively correlated with having school-aged
children though men’s wages seem statistically insensitive to the presence of children.
Overall, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the wages of Australian-born individuals
and immigrants from an English-speaking background. Other immigrants receive
lower wages but we ﬁnd assimilation at least at the 25th percentile.11 Men who
reside in urban areas tend to receive a wage premium even after controlling for
levels of human capital and types of industry.
Table 3 presents the ﬁndings on the eﬀect of changes in potential earnings on
the allocation of time of husbands and wives.12 Figures 1 and 2 summarize the
relationships implied by the estimated coeﬃcients for the benchmark individual
aged between 35 and 44, with no child and with a relative wage equal to 1.13
We ﬁnd a strong association between the hours of market work of married men
and their earnings capacity. An increase in the absolute potential wage of the
husband increases the hours he spends in the formal labor market. This indicates
some degree of substitution of earnings for non-market activities, which are now
relatively more costly. However, past a particular threshold, higher wage rates are
associated with lower levels of hours worked suggesting a backward-bending market
labor supply. In the higher end of the wage spectrum, increased purchasing power
enables men to spend more time on non-market activities. On the other hand,
while the wife’s supply of market work is also positively inﬂuenced by her potential
earnings, the relationship is not signiﬁcant.
The results further indicate that the total time devoted to domestic work by the
husband is unaﬀected by changes in his earnings capacity. Taken together with the
11 McDonald and Worswick (2007) examined the earnings assimilation of male immigrants in
Australia. Using data from Income Distribution Surveys for 1982, 1986 and 1990, they found
that male immigrants from non-English backgrounds have signiﬁcantly lower earnings on arrival
relative to comparable native-born males. This earnings disadvantage is nevertheless narrowed
as the immigrants’ duration of residence in Australia increases. McDonald and Worswick (2007),
however, did not analyze assimilation across diﬀerent quartiles.
12 The estimations presented in this paper use a Tobit-model for labor supply for reasons men-
tioned in the previous section. We also implemented Ordinary Least Squares estimations for
veriﬁcation. The results from these regressions are similar to what we obtain using the Tobit tech-
nique including the results for the decomposition analysis. Results using OLS are available upon
request from the author.
13 We also estimated the model for market work excluding individuals who report more than 40
hours of paid work. Doing so does not signiﬁcantly alter our results.
17estimates for market work, this suggests a behavior characteristic of married men –
a stronger attachment to the formal labor sector than to household production. At
the lower part of the wage distribution, an increase in the absolute wage increases
husbands’ hours of total work – more work in the market with no change in domestic
work hours – while at suﬃciently high wage levels, an increase in his wage translates
to more leisure because of the reduction in market work and no signiﬁcant change
in domestic work.
In contrast, the wife’s domestic labor supply exhibits a positive and concave re-
lationship with respect to her earnings potential. The positive association is rather
surprising as one would normally expect a substitution away from non-market activ-
ities brought about by higher opportunity costs. Nevertheless, the concave proﬁle of
domestic work with respect to absolute wages could provide an explanation to this
behavior. For a wife in the low wage region, an increase in her wage may not be
suﬃcient to allow her to purchase goods and services that substitute for domestic
production. Putting it diﬀerently, an increase in her wage would not be adequate to
compensate for the utility loss if she is to reduce her household production. Above
a certain wage threshold, a higher wage level is associated with lower levels of do-
mestic work hours, which suggests that greater earnings allows for a substitution of
purchased goods and services for domestic production. In this respect, it could be
argued that higher earners regardless of gender are less strained in terms of total
work and enjoy higher levels of leisure.
The coeﬃcient on relative wage, which is the ratio of the individual’s absolute
wage to the absolute wage of his/her spouse, represents the degree of intra-household
bargaining power of the individual in terms of earnings capacity. It is worth noting
that the supply of market work of husbands is inelastic with respect to wives’ earn-
ings potential. Again, this suggests a strong labor market attachment of married
men wherein their supply decisions appear to be insensitive to how much their wives
could earn. Wives, on the other hand, cut back on their market hours when their
relative wage increases. Both spouses would use their bargaining power to reduce
their participation in domestic work. Taking together the negative coeﬃcients of
relative wages in both paid and unpaid labor supply of women, it could be inferred
18that to some extent women bargain for an increase in leisure as they gain earnings
advantage over their husbands.
Having young children (aged less than 15) is unequivocally associated with lower
market work hours and signiﬁcantly higher domestic work for wives. The presence
of pre-school age children tilts the time allocation towards domestic work even more
as they apparently would demand more supervision. The presence of young children
also increases the hours of household work of husbands although the response is not
as strong as that of women’s, which supports the conventional view that childrearing
is largely a woman’s domain.
The coeﬃcients on age groups propose a relatively perceptible pattern of time
allocation along the life-cycle. Younger cohorts of married individuals work longer
hours in the formal labor market and those closer to retirement substantially reduce
their hours in paid work. In parallel, younger individuals tend to devote signiﬁcantly
less number of hours to domestic work than middle aged workers. The slightly older
cohorts (45-54) also have lower hours of domestic work, possibly because they no
longer have dependent children at home and could aﬀord to purchase labor-saving
goods and services. Those nearing retirement complete somewhat greater hours of
housework than the 45-54 cohorts. The substitution of domestic work for paid work
is not perfect and in general, older people tend to have lower total work hours and
enjoy more leisure.
Tables 4 and 5 present the marginal impacts of changes in earnings capacity on
labor supply of native Australians and immigrants. Immigrant families are further
classiﬁed into two groups: couples who originally came from Main English-Speaking
countries and those from other regions.
Supplies of market work of Australian-born and immigrant husbands are posi-
tively and highly signiﬁcantly associated with higher absolute wages but more so for
immigrant men. The estimates imply backward-bending market labor supply curves
for all male groups considered. Immigrant wives also tend to react more strongly to
changes in wage rates than Australian-born females. However, these relationships
are not statistically signiﬁcant. In a qualitative sense, there seems to be no evi-
dence of diﬀerences in the market labor behaviors of native and immigrant couples
19in terms of responses to absolute wages. That is, the supply of paid work of married
men, regardless of nativity, are more strongly and signiﬁcantly sensitive to economic
incentives than the supply of paid work of married women. With respect to relative
earnings, only wives in native partnerships seem to consider their spouses’ earnings
potential and use their bargaining advantage to reduce their hours in the formal
labor market.
The strong intra-household bargaining over hours of domestic work observed in
the full-sample estimations is apparently driven by the behavior of couples from
non-English-speaking countries. For couples in this group, either spouse signiﬁ-
cantly reduces his or her time spent on domestic activities when he or she gains
an earnings advantage over his or her spouse. Non-market activities of immigrants
with English-speaking backgrounds are unaﬀected by spouses’ wage potentials. For
all couples regardless of nativity, the strong inﬂuence of having young children on
time allocation is consistent and its impact is stronger for mothers.
4.2 Decomposition Results
The results of our decomposition analysis are summarized in Table 6. The estimates
presented here use the male labor market behavioral response as the reference.14
The counterfactual scenario is that, in the absence of inherent diﬀerences in gender
behavior, wives with given characteristics – absolute and relative wages, age group,
and number and age of children – will supply the same amount of work as husbands
with the same attributes were supplying.
As with the descriptive statistics, the raw diﬀerential in market work for the full
sample is about 20 hours with men displaying a greater attachment to the labor
market. However, if females would have the same earnings capacities, the gap in
paid work would be reduced by about 6 hours. That is, about a third of the work gap
could be explained by diﬀerences in gender attributes. Although potential wages and
characteristics play an important role in the couples’ time allocation with respect to
14 We ﬁnd that the decomposition of domestic work gap varies more with the choice of reference
equation, which is similar to what Washbrook (2006) observed for UK households. Decomposition
results using the female behavioral response as benchmark are available upon request from the
author.
20market work, much of the diﬀerential tends to be accounted for by the diﬀerence in
their behavior towards market work, or more technically, to the sensitivity of their
market labor supply functions to these covariates. In terms of domestic work, the
decomposition of the gap reveals that there are weaker eﬀects for characteristics and
earnings capacities. Overall, about 80 percent of the gap is due to the diﬀerence in
gender behavior towards domestic work. We could infer that gender eﬀects ﬁgure
more strongly in the distribution of domestic work than in market work.
Our results for the full sample provide evidence that the diﬀerence in earnings
capacities does explain a proportion of the observed diﬀerential in spousal time
allocation but that most of the work gaps are accounted for by the diﬀerences in
labor supply behaviors of partners. Social norms or gender preferences seem to
inﬂuence households towards sustaining gender specialization in sectors of work but
more especially in domestic work. Given the magnitudes of the impact of wages
on market and domestic labor of partners, the trend towards convergence of wages
would appear to equalize shares in market work of spouses more than the distribution
of domestic work. We could venture then that the leveling of earnings potentials
would mean that women would cut back on their leisure hours as the increase in
earnings due to increased wages would not fully translate to substitution of market-
provided goods and services for work at home.
We note, however, that there appears to be heterogeneity among subgroups.
The overall results laid out above apply more to the native families. For immigrant
families, earnings capacities seem to matter more for explaining the diﬀerences in
market labor hours, accounting for 42 percent of the gap for immigrants from non-
English speaking backgrounds and nearly half for families from English-speaking
countries. This suggests that if there is an equalization in spouses’ levels of human
capital or in the returns to their qualiﬁcations, the disparity in the distribution of
market labor will be more greatly reduced for immigrants than for natives. With
respect to domestic work, equalizing earnings potential is most important for immi-
grants of non-English speaking background. Abstracting from Tables 4 and 5, an
improvement in the wages of non-MES immigrant women relative to their husbands’
leads to a bargaining power over household work and leads to a more egalitarian
21distribution of work at home. Since from the descriptive statistics, non-MES im-
migrant women have particularly high formal qualiﬁcations, which do not fall far
behind their husbands’ attributes, our results could imply that improving the re-
turns to qualiﬁcations of these women would signiﬁcantly reduce asymmetry in work
distribution within non-MES households.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The presence of dependent children
The amount of work required for household production increases with the presence
of dependent children and it is reasonable to expect some shifting of hours from
market work to home activities or an increase in total work hours and reduction in
leisure. Because of cultural norms and biological reasons, the increase in domestic
work is expected to aﬀect the time allocation of mothers more strongly. Our earlier
results support this premise. In this section, we check if the couples’ responses to
changes in wages also vary whether or not they have kids, in particular dependent
children (15 years old or younger). For a given change in the wage, having children
to take care of is expected to limit the choice of hours an individual supplies to the
labor market unless there is full substitution of market-provided childcare.
In Table 7 we see a striking contrast in the behaviors of couples without children
and couples with dependent children.15 For childless couples, absolute wages are pos-
itively and strongly associated with hours of paid work regardless of gender, although
the estimated coeﬃcient is higher for men. Both spouses exhibit backward-bending
labor supply curves illustrating the switching relative magnitudes of substitution
and income eﬀects over the wage distribution. The similarity of these partners’ re-
sponses makes it appear as though they were behaving as single individuals. Men
without children do not adjust their hours of domestic work with changes in wages.
On the other hand, women have lower domestic work associated with higher wages
implying shifting of hours towards the paid labor market.
For men with young kids, there is still a signiﬁcant positive relationship between
absolute wages and supply of labor to the formal market. However, the eﬀect is
15 We exclude couples with children who are 16 years old or above since we assume that these
children do not demand too much care from their parents.
22less strong than for childless men. With higher wage rates, mothers to young kids
tend to decrease their time in the labor market and less in domestic work as the
additional earnings allow them to shift their time to more household production.
The absolute gender work gaps for childless households are remarkably lower
than the work gaps for couples with young kids (see Table 8). The market work
diﬀerential for childless couples is about 11 hours per week which is much lower
than the ﬁgure of about 27 for couples with young kids, and their domestic work
gap is only about a third of that of households with young kids. This indicates
that partners without children behave more similarly to each other and even though
men spend more time in the market and women in household production, gender
specialization within these couples is less stark.
Much of the diﬀerence in time allocation of couples with dependent children can-
not be explained by the diﬀerences in earnings capacities or in the ages of spouses.
Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that gender eﬀects are signiﬁcantly relevant in house-
holds with kids, as mothers tend to adjust their time allocation more than their
husbands do, particularly by reducing their hours in the formal labor market. While
the absolute husband-wife gap in the domestic work among childless couples is lower,
we note that most of this gap could be attributed to diﬀerences in gender behavior.
Dual-earner households
In order to reduce unobserved heterogeneity, most studies only include households
where both spouses are employed although doing so weakens the relevance of the
division of labor (Washbrook 2006). Restricting the sample to two-earner families
to some extent allows comparison of spouses in similar conditions.
Two-earner households comprise 60 percent of our original sample; the rest con-
sists of families either with only one breadwinner or both spouses not participating
in the formal labor market. Since we leave out individuals reporting zero hours
of work, we estimate our model using OLS instead of Tobit. Results of our esti-
mations are summarized in Table 9. The responsiveness of males’ market work to
absolute wages is considerably lower compared to our estimates for the full sample.
The time spent by females either in the formal market or household production is
23insensitive to their absolute wage levels. This could imply to some degree that, with
higher earnings, women substitute purchased goods and services, cut back on do-
mestic work and aﬀord more leisure. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship
between domestic work and absolute wages for the subsample of employed males.
This reveals a concave domestic labor supply-absolute wage proﬁle. Men in the
higher end of the wage distribution also tend to substitute higher earnings for less
work at home.
Again, the presence of young children signiﬁcantly aﬀects the time allocation
of women – reduction of hours from the formal market and increase in the time
spent for household production. Men also tend to complement their spouses in
childrearing and devote more time to household production. However, their market
work generally remains unaﬀected by the presence of children and from this, we
could infer that married men tend to give up leisure hours when they have young
kids.
The results of the decomposition analysis show that there appears to be gender
specialization in the distribution of work even when both spouses participate in
the formal labor market. Wages and personal attributes only explain about 19
percent of the gender gap in market work and ﬁve percent of the gender gap in
domestic work. The latter result implies that if women will behave like men toward
household production, the gap in domestic work will virtually disappear. Relative
to our ﬁndings for the full sample of families, gender eﬀects, particularly in domestic
work, seem to perpetuate more strongly for dual-earner families.
Non-labor income
Some studies on household bargaining include non-earned or non-labor income as an
indicator of bargaining power. As with labor income, families may not necessarily
pool income from other sources and control of these funds may inﬂuence the decision
over family resources including work time and leisure. Moreover, Schultz (1990)
comments that “if non-earned income inﬂuences family demand behavior diﬀerently,
depending on who in the family controls the income, then the preferences for that
demand must diﬀer across individuals.” In our case, spouses may diﬀer in their
24propensities to purchase goods and services that substitute for household production
and thereby alter time allocation on domestic work.
We examine whether the level of non-labor income16 inﬂuences the labor sup-
ply behavior of couples, and how it aﬀects the distribution of work between spouses.
Unlike earned income, non-labor incomes are not contaminated by price eﬀects (Lan-
caster and Ray 2002). Therefore we could expect a more straightforward substitution
of work for leisure.
Table 10 shows the eﬀects of non-labor income on labor supply. We ﬁnd that,
for both spouses, a higher level of non-labor income is negatively associated with
the amount of time spent on market work, although the impact on women’s market
work is stronger. Participation of males in household production seems insensitive
to the level of non-labor income. Together with their behavior in the formal market,
it implies that men gain extra time for leisure given a looser budget constraint.
We obtain a positive association between women’s domestic work and non-labor
income although the relationship is only signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. Van der Lippe
and Siegers (1994) note that an increase in non-labor income leads to an increase
in the demand for home production. An increase in the market goods necessary
for home production tends to be complemented by an increase in time inputs. We
also observe that the estimates for the impacts of wages, age group and children are
similar to our original results. That is, the relationships we found earlier seem to be
stable with respect to the inclusion of non-labor income (though this could reﬂect
the fact that non-labor income is usually a small component of an individual’s or a
household’s total income).
While factoring in non-labor income allows for observed characteristics to better
explain the gap in domestic work, its inclusion does not alter the results for the
decomposition of the gender gap in market work.
16 A measure of non-labor income is obtained by combining the individual’s investment income
over the ﬁnancial year (interest income, dividends and royalties, and rent income) with private
pension and private transfers.
255 Conclusions
The paper analyzes the distribution of work among couples in Australia, particularly
the supply of market and domestic labor hours, and examines where such patterns
of time allocation arise from. Our results conﬁrm a strong positive association
between husbands’ earnings capacities and their participation in the formal labor
market. The time contribution of husbands to household production, on the other
hand, appears insensitive to changes in their absolute wage. The market work of
wives is generally less responsive to changes in earnings capacity. We observe that
low earners react to increasing wages by increasing their hours of total work – more
market work for men and more household production for women – thus, putting a
strain to their leisure. On the other hand, high earning individuals translate the
increase in wages to more leisure as they cut back on paid work and substitute
purchased goods and services for domestic production.
From our results, we venture that the diﬀerence in earnings capacities explains
some proportion of the observed diﬀerential in spousal time allocation. However,
most of the work gaps are accounted for by structural diﬀerences in labor supply
behaviors of partners. Social norms or gender preferences seem to inﬂuence house-
holds toward sustaining gender specialization in sectors of work but more especially
in domestic work.
Diﬀerences in wages tend to be more relevant for immigrant families originating
from non-English speaking countries in terms of explaining the division of labor.
Convergence of gender wages would produce the greatest eﬀect on work special-
ization to this particular group. Given that immigrant women from non-English
speaking background have high formal qualiﬁcations, we could assert the signiﬁ-
cance of improved returns to such qualiﬁcations of immigrant women in narrowing
the gender wage gap and in lessening the asymmetry in household work distribution.
Furthermore, we conﬁrm that being a parent, especially of younger children,
unambiguously increases the amount of time spent on home production and signif-
icantly alters the time allocation decisions of couples. Mothers adjust their time
allocation more than fathers do which implies that rearing children remains largely
26a women’s domain. Finally, we note that gender specialization persists even when
both spouses take part in the formal labor market.
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Determinants of Household Allocation of Time
Marginal Eﬀects, Full Sample
Market Work Domestic Work
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Absolute wage 4.948*** 0.672 -0.155 1.160**
(0.327) (0.535) (0.206) (0.547)
Absolute wage2 -0.070*** 0.035** 0.002 -0.042***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.014)
Ln(Relative wage) -3.173 -5.179*** -3.474*** -6.596***
(1.952) (1.791) (1.293) (1.997)
Age 15 to 24 6.273** 2.883 -5.574*** -9.477***
(2.519) (2.233) (1.186) (2.257)
Age 25 to 34 3.260*** 0.620 -1.951** -3.897***
(1.058) (1.007) (0.787) (1.339)
Age 45 to 54 -4.086*** -3.492*** -1.586* -2.458**
(1.098) (0.970) (0.873) (1.210)
Age 55 to 64 -18.384*** -12.650*** -1.591* -0.466
(1.452) (1.089) (0.868) (1.511)
#children age 0 to 4 -0.188 -11.252*** 7.401*** 25.126***
(0.646) (0.674) (0.586) (1.035)
#children age 5 to 14 0.269 -2.380*** 3.469*** 6.346***
(0.534) (0.445) (0.413) (0.623)
#children age 15 to 24 1.052 0.004 -0.056 0.180
(0.808) (0.544) (0.640) (0.706)
#children age 25up -1.988 -1.904 1.025 3.032*
(2.172) (1.864) (1.377) (1.791)
N 7633 7633 7633 7633
Notes. – Standard errors, which are reported in parentheses, are adjusted to take into account
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Determinants of Household Allocation of Time, OLS
Market Work Domestic Work
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Absolute wage 0.919*** 0.088 0.606*** -0.405
(0.253) (0.369) (0.226) (0.549)
Absolute wage2 -0.013*** 0.020** -0.010*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.013)
Ln(Relative wage) 2.805** 9.125*** -2.552* -3.300
(1.251) (1.532) (1.433) (2.113)
Age 15 to 24 -3.373 0.040 -4.460*** -10.428***
(2.900) (3.092) (1.505) (1.766)
Age 25 to 34 0.981 0.366 -1.635* -3.975***
(0.729) (0.832) (0.902) (1.422)
Age 45 to 54 -1.311* -1.847** -1.541** -1.276
(0.745) (0.778) (0.750) (1.166)
Age 55 to 64 -3.505*** -5.539*** -2.424** -2.110
(1.162) (2.006) (1.008) (1.669)
#children age 0 to 4 0.289 -7.998*** 10.166*** 27.332***
(0.508) (0.678) (0.714) (1.149)
#children age 5 to 14 0.379 -2.875*** 3.876*** 6.884***
(0.366) (0.360) (0.396) (0.607)
#children age 15 to 24 0.891** -0.866** 0.057 1.042*
(0.402) (0.428) (0.428) (0.623)
#children age 25up 1.450 -2.110 -1.434 3.077*
(1.420) (1.898) (1.074) (1.640)
Constant 34.867*** 32.882*** 9.806*** 31.731***
(3.480) (3.972) (3.027) (5.685)
R-squared 0.051 0.262 0.183 0.372
N 4629 4629 4629 4629



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Absolute Wage and Time Allocation of Couples
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Notes.– For illustration, ﬁgures are based on an individual aged between 35 and 44, without
a child and with relative wage equal to 1.
44Appendix
Table A1
Definition of Select Variables
Variable Description
Market work Number of hours an individual spends in a typical week on paid employment
including travel time to and from work
Domestic work Number of hours an individual spends in a typical week on unpaid activities
at home including housework, errands, outdoor tasks and childcare
Housework Activities such as preparing meals, washing dishes, cleaning house, etc†
Household errands Activities such as shopping, banking, paying bills, keeping records
(but do not include driving children to school and other activities)†
Outdoor tasks Activities such as home maintenance (repairs, improvements, painting, etc)
car maintenance or repairs and gardening†
Childcare Playing with own children, helping them with personal care, teaching,
coaching or actively supervising them, getting them to child care, school
and other activities†
Absolute wage The potential full-time wage an individual could receive based on
his or her observable characteristics. Prediction techniques are
elaborated in Section 3.
Ln (Relative wage) The potential full-time wage of the individual relative to that of his or her
spouse (in log).
Non-labor income Income earned from investments (interest income, dividends and royalties, rent income)
plus private pensions and private transfers.
MES-Immigrants Immigrants coming from Main-English Speaking countries which refer to
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, USA and South Africa‡
Other Immigrants Immigrants other than those coming from Main-English Speaking countries
Note.– †HILDA Survey Self-Completion Questionnaire, ‡HILDA Online Data Dictionary (2008).
45Table A2 Estimates from Wage Equations used in Predicting Wages
Husbands Wives
OLS 25th Percentile OLS 25th Percentile
Age 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.035***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006)
Main English Speaking -0.050 -0.042 -0.085 -0.149***
(0.053) (0.033) (0.073) (0.036)
Other Immigrants -0.173*** -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.144***
(0.043) (0.034) (0.049) (0.028)
Years since migration 0.002 0.003** 0.003 0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
HS 0.091** 0.046* 0.123*** 0.053**
(0.040) (0.027) (0.040) (0.022)
Cert Diploma 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.103*** 0.029
(0.025) (0.019) (0.037) (0.020)
Bachelor 0.294*** 0.232*** 0.331*** 0.263***
(0.036) (0.024) (0.043) (0.022)
Postgrad 0.407*** 0.362*** 0.351*** 0.293***
(0.037) (0.026) (0.047) (0.024)
Longterm health cond -0.027 -0.022 -0.112*** -0.109***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.028) (0.018)
Victoria -0.004 -0.022 -0.050* -0.041**
(0.027) (0.018) (0.029) (0.017)
Queensland -0.065** -0.042** -0.093*** -0.092***
(0.027) (0.019) (0.033) (0.018)
South Aus -0.047 -0.020 -0.097** 0.023
(0.041) (0.025) (0.042) (0.026)
Western Aus 0.036 0.010 -0.048 -0.066**
(0.034) (0.023) (0.044) (0.029)
Tasmania 0.006 0.054 0.031 -0.060
(0.052) (0.040) (0.088) (0.042)
Northern Territory 0.192 0.268*** 0.064 -0.192***
(0.123) (0.075) (0.239) (0.059)
Aus Capital Territory 0.105** 0.101*** 0.055 0.093**
(0.046) (0.038) (0.108) (0.040)
Other Urban -0.122*** -0.100*** -0.079** -0.066***
(0.023) (0.017) (0.031) (0.017)
Bounded Locality -0.027 -0.003 -0.001 -0.011
(0.062) (0.037) (0.054) (0.041)
Rural -0.198*** -0.171*** -0.028 0.023
(0.036) (0.020) (0.040) (0.020)
#children age 0 to 4 0.020 0.017 -0.012 -0.017
(0.015) (0.011) (0.031) (0.016)
#children age 5 to 14 0.003 0.002 -0.035** -0.024***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008)
#children age 15 to 24 -0.013 -0.022** -0.001 -0.008
(0.018) (0.010) (0.019) (0.009)
#children age 25up 0.041 -0.033 0.061** 0.060**
(0.043) (0.035) (0.031) (0.028)
Constant 2.077*** 1.836*** 2.055*** 2.064***
(0.189) (0.140) (0.240) (0.121)
R squared 0.242 0.292
N 5986 5969 2347 2342
Notes. – See Notes to Table 3. The regression further includes industry and time dummies.
46